W . H. DRAY the assumptions of free will and determinism cannot successfully be resolved by representing the clash as apparent only. The most popular ways of attempting such resolution seem to me to reduce to three. I shall examine each of them briefly in turn.
The first has proved popular in recent years among moral philosophers seeking to protect the meaningfulness of moral judgments in a world increasingly impressed by the success of psychology and the social sciences in their search for laws of human nature. Such philosophers have argued that to contrast freedom with determinism is to make a logical mistake. For the polar opposite of freedom is not determinism but compulsion or constraint; and the opposite of determinism is simply indeterminism. If this is so, it would, of course, follow that the historian's assumption that at least some of the actions he studies are free is perfectly compatible with the assumption that all actions are determined by antecedent conditions-not all of which need be of the sort we call compelling or constraining. Indeed, it has even been argued that, far from assuming any freedom which denies causal determinism, our moral judgments actually require us to assume determinism; for to be our own free act, it is necessary that what we do be determined by our own characters; and for moral blame to be in point, it must be possible for it to produce relevant alterations in the actions of the person to whom it is addressed. If this ingenious argument is sound, the historian need worry no longer about his proneness to make both of the assumptions under discussion. For, far from being incompatible, it would appear that the two may be necessarily connected.
Ingenious as it is, however, it seems to me that this type of argument itself rests upon a logical confusion: the failure to distinguish between freedom of action and freedom of the will. Of course we should not say that a boy who creeps unwillingly to school under threat of punishment goes freely, for this is exactly the sort of situation (and not, for example, a situation in which he is carried or pushed, and thus does not act at all) in which it would be proper to speak of his action as compelled. But whether a person is forced to act in this sense, and therefore lacks freedom of action, is quite irrelevant to the question whether the action he performs is an exercise of free will. What is at stake in raising the latter question is whether, even if his action was compelled or constrained, the agent could nevertheless have acted otherwise--and taken the consequences. It seems to me that if determinism means anything, it means that such an agent could not have acted otherwise, unless certain antecedent conditions-for example, his character or circum-stances-had been a little different. And this claim that all action is fully determined by antecedent conditions actually obtaining is, it seems to me, exactly what the attribution of free will to an agent is intended to deny.
The argument just considered represents an attempt to escape from our difficulty by re-defining "freedom of the will" so that it becomes synonymous with "freedom of action." A second type of argument which is frequently advanced seems to me to attempt to escape by an equally questionable re-definition of "determinism." For it has been argued that, although the doctrine of determinism asserts that whatever happens falls under a law, in accordance with which it might, in principle, have been predicted, we utterly misconceive the nature of such laws if we conclude from this that what happens in accordance with a law happens necessarily. A statement of law, we are often told, is simply the statement that whenever anything occurs which satisfies the specification contained in its antecedent clause, it will be followed by something which satisfies the specification contained in its consequent clause--a point which is sometimes put by calling law statements "descriptive." The laws of nature are, of course, formulated as open universal statements; that is, they are assumed to apply to cases beyond those actually examined in formulating them. But their descriptive rather than prescriptive force is shown, it may be said, in the fact that if experience fails to match the predictions we believe they license us to make, we simply modify our formulation of the laws, so that they conform to what we actually experience. Such laws can scarcely be regarded as governing or necessitating the future; for they are themselves dependent upon what the future happens to bring. Now there are two interpretations which might be placed upon the admitted fact that all statements of law are open to correction in the light of future experience. We might say, for example, that although in asserting such statements we are asserting that certain types of events or conditions are necessarily connected, we can never be absolutely sure (since our inquiry is an empirical one) that at any particular time we have discovered what the necessary connections really are--that is, that our statement of the laws is correct. But those who represent the assumptions of free will and determinism as compatible in the light of a "descriptive" analysis of law, obviously want to derive much more radical conclusions from this well-known methodological fact. They want to say that a law formulates, not necessary, but purely factual, connections; they want to say that in stating a law they are simply asserting that the regularity it formulates will in fact hold in the future. I think it is clear that a belief in laws of this sort is quite compatible with a belief in human free will; for there would appear to be no reason, on this view of their logical status, why men may not make their own laws of behaviour by exercising that free will-it being, in that case, impossible in principle, not only for the determinist, but for God himself, to know what the laws are going to be, until the last man has had his fling. The reduction of "law" to "regularity in fact holding in past, present and future"-and it should be noted that some of these so-called "regularities" might have but a single actual instance-in effect reduces the determinist's claim from the assertion that what will be must be, to the merely tautologous assertion that what will be will be--with perhaps the equally tautologous corollary that, if (with luck) we succeed in saying what it is that will be before it comes about, then what will be will necessarily be what we may say it will be. That this is what is ordinarily meant by the assumption of determinism, appears to me quite incredible.
It remains to mention a third way of dealing with the problem: the drawing of a Kantian distinction between two standpoints from which human actions can be viewed: the one, the standpoint of the agent, from which the assumption of free will is made; the other, the standpoint of an observer of the action, from which causal determinism is assumed. Such an approach has at least the merit of not attempting to explain the contradiction away; it attempts instead to find a way of living with it. But although the doctrine of the double standpoint does serve in some ways to clarify the problem-and I shall make use of its terminology again below-it is difficult to see how it can be represented, as it stands, as a "solution" to it. If we interpret Kant's own formulation literally, the "solution" consists of locating free action and determined behaviour in different worlds, so that the problem of their incompatibility is not allowed to arise: a "solution" which eliminates the clash by asserting a mystery. But if we interpret the doctrine rather as pointing out that there are two ways of thinking about the same world, are we really any nearer understanding how it is logically possible to make both assumptions?
Perhaps a psychologist or a social scientist might, for the limited purposes of his own inquiry, ignore such difficulties on the ground that his approach to his subject-matter is consistently made from a single standpoint: that of an observer of action. But for the historian, no such easy escape from the problem is possible. For even if-as is seldom the case--he denies himself the luxury of pronouncing overt moral judgments upon the actions he studies, he will at least want to investigate them from the standpoint of the agents who performed them, as well as from the standpoint of a social observer. 4 Committed as he is by the very nature of his inquiry to such a double standpoint, the historian seems to be faced with a dilemma which surely justifies the conceptual uneasiness displayed by Professor Beard. For if his causal judgments do, as is generally assumed, imply a full-blooded determinism, he must either admit two worlds, or he must contend that the agent, the cause of whose actions he has discovered, both could and could not have done otherwise. And unless some further elucidation of the latter contention is forthcoming, it would appear to involve the historian in an obvious self-contradition.
II
I have argued that belief in determinism, which is usually thought to be implied by causal judgment, cannot be reconciled with the assumption of free will which historians normally make in investigating what was done by various persons in the past. The question I now want to raise is whether causal judgment in history really does imply determinism. It seems to me that, in so far as it is human action in the full sense that historians are dealing witb, tbe answer to tbis question must be in the negative. For, as I shall now attempt to show, the connection between actions and the causes historians discover for them is in most, although perhaps not all, cases "loose" in a way whicb makes it impossible to say that those actions are determined by their causes. ' My claim that the causes of action in history are only loosely connected with their effects is open to more than one interpretation. Let me begin, therefore, by saying what I do not mean by it. One thing I do not mean is that historians-perhaps because of the special problems encountered in their inquiry, perhaps because of some unfortunate deficiency in their scientific training-generally use the causal concept loosely in the sense of "without proper justification," or "without precision." No doubt it is the case that causal judgments in history are often "loose" in these senses-a fact which has sometimes been represented as explaining the notorious reluctance of historians to admit that the particular causal judgments they make commit them to corresponding causal laws. But to argue from this that causal judgment in bistory does not imply determinism would not be very convincing. For the question we wish to answer is what the historian's causal statements mean, not whether, having made a causal judgment, he can usually produce sufficient grounds for asserting it, including, perhaps, a relevant causal law. From the mere fact that historians are seldom happy about asserting such laws, it is difficult to derive anything of importance for our present inquiry. For it is plausible to argue that the historian's judgment is intellectually respectable precisely to the extent to which it can be defended by reference to a law-that is, precisely to the extent to which the assumption of determinism is given content.
There is a second, and philosophically more interesting, sense in which the causal judgments of historians might be said to be "loose," although I mention this, too, only to rule it out of consideration here. What I have in mind is the well-known fact that, although, according to the theory of determinism, for everything that occurs there must have been a set of sufficient conditions, what is actually called the cause, in the course of historical narrative, is never more than one or a few necessary conditions of what is said to be caused. Why some antecedent conditions are selected by historians, while others are not, is a question which has not yet been given all the attention it deserves from philosophers. The view which generally appears to be accepted is that the conditions selected as "causal" are those which can most conveniently be used to produce or prevent occurrences of the kind under studyalthough it is often difficult to see how such a criterion explains the causal judgments which historians actually make. What concerns us here, however, is simply the fact that such selection is made; for it might be argued that, since no one would claim that the conditions selected as causes are sufficient conditions of their effects, they cannot be said to determine their effects. As an attempt to find a logical cleavage between the concepts of causation and determinism in history, I think it is clear that such an argument does not take us far. For it is usually assumed by those who insist that causes are mere necessary conditions, that such causes invariably-even if we do not always know what they are---<:omplete a set of sufficient conditions. And it is assumed that they could not be used to produce or prevent anything if the other necessary conditions of the effect were not forthcoming.
The analysis of "cause" as "a necessary condition of practical importance, which completes a set of sufficient conditions" was given classic expression by R. G. Collingwood in his brilliant discussion of the concept of causation in An Essay on Metaphysics. In view of the fact that contemporary philosophers often admit their indebtedness to Collingwood in this connection, and in view of the latter's eminence both as historian and as philosopher of history, it seems to me rather curious that what has been, in this way, accepted so gratefully from him, has been confined to a point which Collingwood himself thought relevant only to our understanding of the concept of causation (he called it Sense II) as it is used, not in history, but in the practical sciences of nature." By contrast, the analysis which he offered of what he regarded as the historian's own special sense of the term (he called it Sense I) appears to have been almost completely ignored. What I now propose to argue is that if the contrast which Collingwood draws between what he calls Sense I and Sense II is correct, the apparent clash of causal and indeterministic assumptions in the historian's study of human actions will be found to imply a connection between cause and effect which is "loose" in a way siguificantly different from either of those considered so far.
According to Collingwood, when we make causal judgments Sense II, "natural events are considered from a human point of view as events grouped in pairs, where one member in each pair, C, is immediately under human control."" Examples of such judgments would be: "the cause of books going mouldy is their being in a damp room; the cause of a man's sweating is a dose of aspirin .... "8 In this sense of the term, what is caused is always a natural event, and what causes it is something that was, or could have been, either a human action or the result of one.
By contrast, what is caused in Sense I of the concept is always "the free and deliberate act of a conscious and responsible agent."9 It is in this sense, declares Collingwood, "that a solicitor's letter causes a man to pay a debt, or that bad weather causes him to return from an expedition."'· Thus, if we read in the newspapers of the time, "Mr. Baldwin's speech causes adjournment of the House," and if we assume that the journalist's causal judgment is, as it should be, made in the standard historical sense, then we can immediately infer that "on hearing Mr. Baldwin's speech, the Speaker freely made up his mind to adjourn.""
If we can really make the latter inference, we must ask what we mean, then, by saying that the Speaker's action was "caused" by the speech. In Sense II, the connection between cause and effect is to be elucidated in terms of our discovery that by means of the cause we can manipulate or control the effect. What is the nature of the connection between an effect and its cause Sense I? Collingwood himself says that such causes provide human agents with motives for acting in the way we call their effects. Now "motive" is a difficult and perhaps equivocal term; but on the basis of the examples given, I think it would be legitimate to claim that the sense of the term envisaged here makes it equivalent to "reason for acting." Having been given. by Baldwin's speech, a reason for adjourning the House, the Speaker therefore adjourns it; and if questioned later as to the cause of his action, it is this reason which he would doubtless produce in reply. We might say, therefore, that the connection between a cause Sense I and its effect is a rational one. Now even if it is held (and this is quite debatable) that the admission that we sometimes act for the sake of a reason is compatible with the doctrine that all actions are determined, it seems to me quite impossible to claim that determinism is implied by the Speaker's causal report in this instance. The cause is certainly, in such a case, a condition which was necessary, in the sense that without it there would have been no reason for doing what the Speaker did. And if the Speaker's action is to be fully explained by reference to such a cause, taken in conjunction with certain other relevant considerations, we may also say that it must provide a sufficient reason for acting in the way he did. That there was such a cause, however, can surely not be taken to justify the conclusion that the agent could not have acted otherwise. For in this sense of "cause," it is (at least in part) up to the agent himself what the cause of his action shall be. A causal candidate will become effective, and hence become "the cause" of his action, only if the agent accepts it as his cause, if he makes it his cause. To put it another way, if an agent has cause to act, and acts accordingly, that cause may become the cause of his action. But we cannot, in advance, rule out the possibility that, whether out of perversity or stupidity, he will fail to act accordingly.
The sense in which the connection between cause and effect in such cases is "loose" should be clear in the light of these remarks. For if it does not follow that, because of what we will ex post facto call the cause of an action, the action will necessarily be performed, then the causal judgment does not imply that the action, if it is performed, is determined by its cause. The assumption of determinism can thus be dropped by the historian with a good conscience, and without the self-denying ordinance suggested by Professor Beard. For the belief that human actions are not determined need not restrict in any important way the causal analyses which it is the historian's proper business to carry out.
!II
There will no doubt be those who, although they may agree with my claim that what a historian calls the cause of an action will often be what the agent regards as his reason for acting, will refuse to accept my conclusion that in such cases the causal judgment is not deterministic. Since I must admit that there are some doubts in my mind as to whether Collingwood himself consistently maintained such a claim, let me try to elucidate my own thesis further by examining two difficulties which I find in Collingwood's discussion of cause Sense I.
The first arises out of his response to the implicit question what constitutes a complete cause Sense I? When this question arises with respect to cause Sense II, Collingwood is careful to insist that, although for its operation such a cause requires certain conditiones sine quibus non, and thus could be called covertly deterministic, nevertheless it is a mistake to regard such additional conditions as forming part of the cause. For it is the essence of a causal judgment Sense II that it should single out a condition of practical importance. If the other necessary conditions of the effect are incorporated into the cause, we get an overtly deterministic sense which Collingwood refers to as Sense IIIand which, in spite of the fact that Hume and others have centred their attention on it, he regards as a philosopher's invention of dubious validity and no practical importance. Now if we turn our attention to causes Sense I, it would seem reasonable to expect a similar analysis. It is obvious, for instance, that Mr. Baldwin's speech, even if it is quite properly selected by the historian as the cause of the Speaker's dissolution of the House, is selected from a number of antecedent conditions, of which many others-if only the fact that the House was sitting-were relevant to the Speaker's decision to act. In order to understand why such a speech provided the Speaker with a reason or motive to act, we should thus, as in the case of causes Sense II, have to make many other "considerations" for granted. The question arises, then, whether, if what we take for granted were made explicit, the connection between the cause (plus the other conditions) and the effect would not become as tight, and thus as deterministic, as a cause Sense III. I must admit that the conclusion that it would finds some justification in what Collingwood actually says.
Thus, in amplifying his definition of the historical sense, he tells us:
A cause in Sense I is made up of two elements, a causa quod or efficient cause and a causa ut or final cause. The causa quod is a situation or state of things existing; the causa ut is a purpose or state of things to be brought about. Neither of these could be a cause if the other were absent. 12 If Collingwood had left it at that, perhaps our present problem would not have arisen; for it might be argued that even when all such "con-siderations" have been specified, they necessitate the agent's doing what he did only in a non-deterministic or rational sense, which allows us to say that he might have done otherwise. But Collingwood goes on to add that "the causa ut is not a mere desire or wish, it is an intention"; it is not just the agent's "wanting to act that way, but his meaning to act that way" (my italics). Such a remark I can only attribute to an unnoticed and inconsistent hankering, on Collingwood's part, after the tightness of a cause Sense III: a hankering which brings the whole analysis of cause Sense I into confusion at this point. For if by "intention" Collingwood means something like "executive decision to act at the time of acting," then the agent's intention cannot be part of the cause Sense 1. It cannot be this for the very good reason that it is part of the effect. Causes in this sense, it must be remembered, are represented as explaining actions; and as Collingwood himself insists in The Idea of History (p. 213), actions have an "inside" as well as an "outside": a movement is not an action at all unless the ageut intends to move. But if, on the other haud, "intention" is to mean something less than thisfor example, something to be explained by contrasting a genuine purpose with an idle wish-then the connection between effect and cause Sense I is no longer tight. For the purpose which is the cause, rather than a part, of the action is one which the agent must choose to implement. Once this point is clarified, I see no need to allow that it is implied by a causal judgment Sense I that what an agent did was, in principle, predictable from the cause of his action, in conjunction with any set of antecedent conditions which excludes his executive decision to act. But there is a second feature of Collingwood's discussion which may seem to cast doubt upon my claim that this is what he himself maintained. For Collingwood seems to me to place undue and misleading emphasis on cases in which the person making the causal judgment causes someone else to act by affording him a motive for doing so-the judgment of Mr. Baldwin, for example, that his speech caused the Speaker to adjourn the House. Thus at one point we are told that the experience from which our concept of cause Sense I is derived is our experience of "social life" -"the practical relations of man to man."" And again, in explaining why he calls Sense I the "historical" sense, Collingwood says that it is "because it refers to a type of case in which both cause and effect are human activities such as form the subject matter of history"" (my italics). The impression we might get (although I think quite wrongly) from such remarks is that, in terms of experience, the meaning-content of causal judgments Sense I is to be found in those situations in which we find we can manipulate, not natural events, but our fellow men. And to say this comes very close to reducing Sense I to the covertly deterministic Sense II-the only difference being between wbat sort of thing is said to be caused in each case. Since the connection between causes and effects in both senses would then be of the same non-rational (that is, experimental) type, tbe difference of subject-matter would appear to be of no theoretical interest.
That Collingwood did not think tbat Sense I is in any such way reducible to Sense II is quite clearly asserted in the course of his discussion. And his offering, as an illustration of Sense I, the example, "bad weather causes a man to return from an expedition," would seem to show that, for him, it is accidental, and not essential, that in Sense I of the concept, the cause, as well as the effect, sbould be a buman action. If we are to discover the essential meaning of Sense I, I suggest that we concentrate our attention on cases wbere tbe cause is not itself an action; for it is in those cases that it becomes clear that Sense I is an agent's selfapplied concept of causation: it is an idea wbich can be ostensively defined only from tbe standpoint of a person whose action is caused, not from that of someone who causes it. As I have already tried to show, the meaning of a causal judgment Sense I is to be found in tbe experience of an agent wbo finds cause to act. If an observer or a manipulator claims to know wbat the cause of such an action was, what he means, as opposed to what he bimself experiences, will be something wbicb he bas experienced in cases wbere be was himself an agent-and wbicb he believes himself justified in attributing to other agents in so far as be can, in imagination, put bimself at their standpoints.
It bas been a commonplace since Hume tbat we cannot experience the element of necessity in the causal relation between two physical objects or events. In one of the few references to Collingwood's discussion of cause Sense I whicb I have found, Professor A. J. Ayer bas argued that, in the case of a man wbose action is caused in this sense, we are equally at loss to explain what we mean by saying that a causal judgment asserts a necessary connection between cause and effec!." But Ayer's argument can only be valid, it seems to me, if we follow him in regarding causation as exclusively an observer's or a manipulator's concept. For the agent whose action is caused can experience the necessity of the cause-the necessity of acting for the sake of a reasonaltbough doubtless tbis is not the sort of necessity that Ayer, or any modern Humian, would wisb to find. For it is clearly not tbe kind whicb deternrinists would attribute to what falls under a true law of nature.
IV
I have considered and rejected the suggestion that cause Sense I might be reducible to cause Sense II or Sense III. It was Collingwood's own doctrine, of course, that the sense of the concept employed in historical studies is not only independent and clearly understood, but is, in fact, the one from which the allegedly scientific sense or senses-which he does not think clear at all-are themselves derived by analogy. On such an account. the difficulties encountered by such philosophers as Hume and Russell, in their attempt to explain what we mean by causation in nature, are traceable to the inevitable carry-over of meaning, derived from our experience as agents, into a context which for most of us nowadays appears inappropriate. Thus cause Sense II, according to Collingwood, not only is a concept the use of which presupposes "the point of view of a practical agent, anxious to find out how he can manipulate nature for the achieving of his own ends," but also involves the idea that "man's manipulation of nature resembles one man's manipulation of another man, because natural things are alive in much the same way that men are alive .... " 16 Similarly, when, in Sense In, we judge that it was the impact of one billiard ball on another which caused the second to move, we imply that "a billiard ball struck by another and set in motion would have liked to be left in peace .... "11 For how else can we explain the distinction which we wish to draw between our concepts of causation and of mere Humian constant conjunction?
There are, of course, many philosophers who would agree with Collingwood that the concept of causation, as it stands, has not only anthropocentric but also anthropomorphic implications of this sort. And many of them would doubtless argue that, since these implications are unacceptable for the purpose of scientific inquiry, what we must do is either strip the concept of them, or extrude the concept itself from the language of science-a course which was advocated, for example, by Bertrand Russell. Since history, at any rate in some sense, aims at being "scientific," it may be tempting for philosophers of history to assume that, for historical inquiry, a similar conceptual moral should be drawn. I should like to suggest that, whether or not the anthropomorphic implications of the causal concept justify its rejection in natural science, it is clearly a mistake to urge that these same implications render it unfit for the task of interpreting, not natural events, but human actions. Should we not ask, rather, how we do use the concept of causation in exclusively human contexts-those contexts which Collingwood thought to require a special historical sense? And should we not do this without assuming beforehand that the historian's concept will turn out to he simply a variant-and probably an inferior, rather sloppy variant-of a concept which already has a clear and independent meaning in the interpretation of nature? 
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